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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
 7KHIRFXVRIWKHGLVVHUWDWLRQ
The European Community (EC)1 acted as one body at the United Nations Conference for
Climate Change (UNCCC) in Kyoto in December 1997, and had the most ambitious proposal
of all the major actors at the conference in terms of percentage reductions in CO2 emissions2.
This dissertation will discuss how the EU was able to agree on a common aim for reduction in
the emissions of CO23. Who were the forces behind it and who worked against it?
In every complex process of decision-making, multiple interpretations are inevitable.
Different analysts revisiting a sequence of group decisions will often draw contrasting
conclusions as to the balance of causes of the final outcome (Mintzer and Leonard, 1994,
p.23). This dissertation will not attempt to trace the intricacies of the decision-making process
towards the final agreement, and provide the ultimate answer to how and why things
happened. Rather it will attempt to identify the most important actors within the EU and their
motives. Who where the proponents of a common EC target for reduction in CO2 emissions
and what motivated them?
Who were the opponents of such a policy and why? Was the final decision a result of
bargaining among the member-states, or did other supranational actors such as the
Commission influence the process?
 7KHGHOLPLWDWLRQRIWKHGLVVHUWDWLRQ
This dissertation will first and foremost look at the roles of the Commission and the member-
states. There are of course other actors that are important in shaping EU environmental
policies such as the other EU institutions; The European Court of Justice and the European
Parliament, and more informal actors such as the industry lobby and environmental groups. In
the discussion about a common reduction target, Europe-wide industry organisations such as
The Union of Industrial Companies and Employers (UNICE) and The European Chemical
Industry Federation, were particularly active (Sebenius, 1995, p. 55). Environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGO’s) and the Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced
Environment (GLOBE) in Europe contributed to rising public awareness on the issue (EEA,
1998).
Together, all these groups were significant in order to shape the preferences and interests of
both national and European actors. Recognising the importance of the informal actors, the
main focus in this dissertation will be on the formal actors in the decision-making process.
                                                
1
 It is the EC that has the legal competence in the area of climate policy. The EC is the former European
Economic Community and after the Maastricht Treaty, the EC is one of the three pillars that constitute the
European Union. This dissertation will hence refer to the EC climate target, but use the term EU when discussing
policies and development in general. See Nigel Haigh (1996) for more discussion on this.
2
 The Association of Southern Island States, AOSIS, proposed a 60% reduction of CO2 emissions. Among the
decisive parties to the Convention, The EC proposal was however the most ambitious.
3
 Both the EC reduction target and the final Kyoto target was based on reductions in several greenhouse-gases.
Carbon dioxide is however by far the largest contributor to climate change, and for simplicity, this dissertation
will refer to CO2 emissions.
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There are a number of theories on how the EU should be studied. The most fundamental
discussion among scholars on European integration, is on whether it is the member-states or
supranational institutions that are driving the process (Jachtenfuchs, Diaz and Jung 1998).
This dissertation seeks to contribute to this discussion by identifying and examining the
driving forces within the EU behind the common climate target of March 1997. Believing that
the Commission and the Council are the key actors, the concentration will be on their role.
Secondly, the dissertation will focus mainly on the decision to have a common target, not on
how to implement it. Since climate change first appeared as an issue on the political agenda in
the Community, there has been an on-going discussion on which strategy, and what measures
that should be applied to reach the stabilisation target, and later the reduction target.
Particularly the proposal from the Commission of a common energy/ CO2 tax was the subject
of long-lasting and intensive debates (Lee, 1995 and Wagner, 1997). The scope of the
dissertation does however not permit me to go into this discussion. The strategy-debate will
only be referred to in order to explain the views of the various actors in the debate on whether
the Community should have a common CO2 target or not. Britain’s lack of enthusiasm
towards a common reduction target can for instance to some extent be explained by the
possibility that this would entail a delegation of fiscal powers to the European level (Wagner,
1997).
A third delimitation in the dissertation will be in time. The debate on a common climate
policy has been on the political agenda in the EU since the late 1980s and is still a much-
discussed issue. The main focus here will however be on the period that started with the UN
conference in Berlin the spring of 1995 and ended in March 1997 when the Environmental
Council agreed on a common reduction target. The preceding process will be touched upon in
order to give the context and a better understanding of the positions of the various actors.
 0HWKRGRORJ\
This dissertation will attempt to describe the process towards the agreement of March 1997.
By looking at the various proposals put forward and the arguments applied to defend and
oppose them, it will seek to understand the interests and roles of the most important actors.
The study is mainly based on three sources of information, official documents, secondary
literature and interviews.
Official documents and reports constitute an important part of the source material, as they
provide the actual agreements and the factual background for the decisions. They are also
interesting because they to some extent are applied by the actors to express their interests and
intentions both before and during the internal process towards a common reduction target.
One problem when analysing official statements is however the possible gaps between
substantial and tactical interests. According to Dysvik (1997, p. 35): ‘The fact that a political
document states that something shall be done is not the same as it actually being performed.’
It can therefore be difficult to reveal the ‘true’ preferences and interests of the actors.
Articles and books by other researchers are an important source, not only for the theoretical
parts of the dissertation, but also for empirical observations. One problem has however been
the restricted amount of written literature on the process itself. As the dissertation is looking
at a very recent process, the amount of empirical literature concerning this particular period
&,&(523ROLF\1RWH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has been quite limited. Still I find that the existing empirical material has been sufficient to
give a realistic description of the process.
Finally, interviews have been used to some extent. Getting to the decision-makers in the
process is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, interviews with observers of the process
such as the Executive Director of the EEA and Norwegian government officials that
participated in the international negotiation process, have provided valuable insight.
Discussions with researchers in the field have also been useful and important.
To uncover what really happened, extensive knowledge of the motivations of the actors and
the interplay between them would have been necessary. These sources have not been
available, and the conclusions in chapter seven are hence not proposed as the complete and
definitive explanation to why the EU decided on a common climate target.
 7KHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHGLVVHUWDWLRQ
First of all, the EC proposal to the Kyoto conference and its implications will be elaborated.
Then the various theoretical approaches to environmental policy-making in the EU will be
examined and discussed. This will be followed by a brief presentation of the process within
the EU towards a common proposal on CO2 reductions, and a more thorough discussion on
the role and motives of the various actors according to the theoretical approaches. Finally
there will be a discussion on which of the theoretical approaches that best explain the
development towards the decision to have a common climate target.
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 $FRPPRQFOLPDWHSURSRVDO
 7KH3URSRVDO
In March 1997, the Environment Council adopted a common negotiating position on climate
change for inclusion in the Community’s protocol proposal to the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The proposal was a 15% reduction in CO2 emissions by
2010, compared to 1990 for all industrialised countries that are parties to the Convention. At
the June Environment Council, Ministers also agreed to include an intermediate reduction
objective of at least 7.5% for 20054 in the negotiating proposal.
The proposal was based on burden sharing where some countries, in particular Germany,
contributed substantially to the total reductions5 while the so-called cohesion countries6 were
entitled to increase their emissions in the period.
The rationale behind this burden sharing was that Member States that start from relatively low
levels of energy consumption, and therefore low emissions per capita, should be entitled to
have CO2 targets and strategies corresponding to their economic and social development (The
Council, 1997). They should therefore be allowed to increase their emissions of CO2, while
improving the energy efficiency of their economic activities.
The distribution of responsibilities among the member-states takes account of national
circumstances and capabilities in sectors such as electric power generation, internationally
oriented energy intensive industry, transportation, light industry, agriculture, households and
services. Finally it takes account of the potential for energy efficiency improvement. The
long-term aim is according to the Council a convergence of CO2 emissions between Member
States (Ibid). The proposal was conditional in the sense that it stressed that the final protocol
from the UNFCCC in Kyoto would determine the final Community target.
The differentiation formula as agreed on the March meeting was as follows7:
                                                
4
 European Council (1997) Community Strategy on Climate Change, Document 6309/07 Council conclusions
5
 Germany’s contribution in the March 1997 agreement amounted to over 80% of the total reductions.
6
 A cohesion country is an EU member-state which GDP is less than 90% of the average GDP in the member-
states. Because of this, the cohesion countries are entitled to financial support from the Community to ensure
economic development. Today, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland are in this category.
7
 At this stage only 9.2% of the total reductio target was distributed. The remaining 5.8% were to be distributed
after Kyoto (Ringius 1997)
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7DEOH&KDQJHVLQHPLVVLRQOHYHOVLQUHODWLYHWROHYHOV
0(0%(567$7(6 (0,66,215('8&7,216,1)25&2&203$5('72
BELGIUM -10%
DENMARK -25%
GERMANY -25%
GREECE +30%
SPAIN +17%
FRANCE 0%
IRELAND +15%
ITALY -7%
LUXEMBOURG -30%
NETHERLANDS -10%
AUSTRIA -25%
PORTUGAL +40%
FINLAND 0%
SWEDEN +5%
UNITED KINGDOM -10%
Since the March 1997 agreement, the member-states percentages have been modified. In July
1998 the Environment Council presented the new obligations of the EC member-states. To
comply with the Kyoto Protocol, the target years have changed to 2008-2012 in relation to the
emissions in 1990.  Some member-states have only adjusted their national targets to the new
timetable, whereas other substantially has changed their target.  The Netherlands, Denmark,
Germany and Austria have all reduced their national targets with 4% - 12%. The cohesion
countries have on the other hand strengthened their obligation in terms of lower increases in
emissions. From expecting a 40% increase, Portugal has now accepted a 15% increase, while
Greece has changed her target from 30% to 25% increase in emissions of CO29. However,
despite these adjustments, the principle of burden sharing is still fundamental, and the
implications of an EC climate target is the same.
 7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH3URSRVDO
The decision of March 1997 was unique for several reasons. Firstly, burden sharing in this
scale is new both in the EU and in international negotiations in general. The concept of
differentiated responsibilities has once before been applied in the Large Combustion Plant
                                                
8
 Source: European Council (1997) Community Strategy on Climate Change, Document 6309/07 Council
conclusions.
9
 Council Conclusions (1998) Community Strategy on Climate Change,  16-17 June 1998
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directive (LCP)10, but then in a far smaller scale (Haigh, 1997). The greenhouse gas
agreement is substantially more far-reaching and can have decisive impact on the
development of future environmental agreements in the EU.
Another important aspect with the establishing of a common target in climate policy, are the
subsequent limitations on other policy areas. Climate change is a particularly difficult
environmental problem to deal with because of the close links between economic
development and emissions of CO2. Economic growth has till now almost been synonym to
increased use of fossil fuels as oil, coal and gas, and thereby increased emissions of CO2. A
policy to prevent climate change will have fundamental effects on policy areas such as
transport, energy and industrial development. Efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions are
multi-sectoral and costly, and will inevitably have implications for economic policy and social
habits (Wagner, 1997, p. 298).
In the early phase of EU environment policy, the primary response to environmental problems
was to correct environmental problems, as they appeared (The Commission, 1996a). Among
environment policy-makers, there has however been a growing awareness that environmental
problems are closely linked to other policy areas, and that environmental concern has to be
integrated as a decision premise in other policy areas.
The fifth environmental programme of the EU ‘Towards Sustainability’ for the period 1992 –
2000, is based on this approach to environmental problems (Colliere, 1996, p 4). It stresses
the importance of integrating environmental concerns into other major Community policies
such as industry, energy and transport. Till now, there has however been no significant
examples on these principles applied in practise. The completing of the Single European
Market was pursued without consideration of its environmental implications (Weale and
Williams 1993). One result of this was that the Commission had to conclude in 1996, that
‘The objective of internalising the environmental costs of transport has not, on the whole,
been put into practise’ (The Commission, 1996a).
The same is happening with the energy marked. In July 1996, the Council decided to start
deregulating the energy market with the aim of achieving lower energy prices. This will
unquestionably lower the incentives for investments in energy efficiency improvements.
According to Collier (1997, p. 16): ‘little consideration has been given to these conflicts of
interests’ and she concludes that the introduction of a more sustainable energy policy, as
referred to in the Commission’s White Paper on Energy Policy, ‘remains largely an illusion’.
Both transport and energy are crucial policy areas when it comes to reducing the emissions of
CO2. The implementation of the emission target will be impossible without a new approach to
policy making in these sectors. The decision on a common climate target can therefore alter
the way in which environmental policy is pursued in the EU, and make the ambitions of the
fifth environmental programme become reality (Haigh, 1996).
As this discussion has shown, an effective EU climate policy will touch the core of policies
for economic development. A third aspect of a common EC target is therefore that it will put
severe limits on policy areas that previously were determined by the member-states. By
establishing climate policy as a common policy, the member-states also transfer the
competence for the setting of future national targets to the Council. The delegation of policies
                                                
10
 In the mid-1980s the EC agreed on an EC-wide reduction of Sulphur Dioxide from large combustion plants
based on burden-sharing among the member-states.
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to the EU level has until now, in all policy areas, implied that the future competence also is
transferred to a European level (Haigh, 1996). Once a policy area has become common
policy, new targets and aims in this area are also set on the EU level.
A forth consequence of the transfer of a policy issue or policy area from the member-states to
a European level is that this gives the Commission the competence to represent the
Community in international fora. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated in a ruling in
1971 that where the EC has legislated this automatically confers the powers to act externally
(Wagner, 1997)11. Adoption of internal EC legislation leads to a loss in external competence
for the member-states (Wagner, 1997 and Haigh, 1996).  The external competence of the EC
is based in the Treaty of Rome. According to article 210 and 228, the Community can enter
into binding agreements and do thereby achieve what in international law is known as a legal
personality (Hession, 1995)12
As this examination has shown, the setting of an EC target for reduction of CO2 emissions has
far-reaching consequences and entails a transfer of competence from the member-states to the
EU (Haigh, 1996, p. 177). Before discussing why the EU embarked on a common climate
target, there will be a review of various theoretical approaches to how EU environmental
policy has developed.
                                                
11
 Since this ruling, the ECJ has repeatedly decided that competence for external affairs can be implied under
the treaty of Rome (Haigh, 1991).
12
 As cited in Wagner 1997, p.302
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 7KHRUHWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHVRQHQYLURQPHQWDO
SROLF\PDNLQJLQWKH(8
Environmental policy was not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, but has later become an
important policy area in the EU. By looking at the amount of environmental legislation and
directives, many have concluded that EU environmental policy has been a success (Ute
Colliere, 1995). According to Johnson and Corcelle (1989, p. 2) environmental policy is ‘not
only a major Community policy, but also an undeniable success, despite certain gaps and
weaknesses’. More than 200 directives and regulations covering a number of areas are in
force, and five Environmental Programs have been produced. The Community has become
the ‘main driving force of environmental policy in Western Europe’ (Wagner, 1997, p. 311),
and it is now impossible to understand the development of the environmental policy in the
member-states without reference to EU policy (Hertiere et. al, 1996). How can this
development be explained?
There are various views on how the EU should be studied. One of the current debates is on
whether the EU should be regarded as unique, a case ‘sui generis’13, or if it is possible to
compare decision-making in the Community with decision-making in other political systems
(Hix, 1998). Without going further into that discussion, this dissertation follows Hix (1998, p.
55), who argues that in the EU (as in all other political systems) the ‘key determinant of
political outcomes are the spatial locations of the actors, strategic bargaining between these
positions, and the identity of the agenda-setters and veto-players’.
The main division among the scholars of European integration goes however between those
who emphasise the role and importance of supranational institutions as a driving force in the
integration process, and those who deny that they have such a role (Jachtenfuchs, Diaz and
Jung 1998). This dissertation will examine two opposing views in this field, namely the neo-
functionalist perspective and the inter-governmentalist perspective.
 7KHQHRIXQFWLRQDOLVWSHUVSHFWLYH
The neo-functionalists argue that the dynamics of integration are mainly mechanic in the
sense that integration in one sector inevitably leads to integration in other sectors, the so-
called 'spill-over' effect. Closer integration in terms of the development of common policy is
thought to be more due to spill-over than to inter-governmental conferences.   
The expansion of environmental policy in the EU is according to this view first and foremost
a result of functional spill-over from the internal market. Different environmental regulation
in the member-states causes trade distortion and necessitate action at the Community level.
EU environmental policy is hence an answer to the shortcomings due to the conflict between
domestic environmental policy and the single market.  (Pollack, 1994, Hildebrand, 1993 and
Ghering, 1997)
A neo-functionalist approach also emphasises the role of institutions in EU policy-making
(Golub, 1997, Dysvik, 1997). By making proposals, facilitate bargaining and supply of
                                                
13
 One of the proponents of this view, Schmitter, has even argued in several articles that a new EU-vocabulary
should be introduced to describe the special features of the EU.
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organisational skills, the Commission can exercise task-oriented leadership and promote the
spill-over process (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, p. 129). A neo-functionalist explanation
would hence focus on the role of the Commission in the development of environmental policy
(Golub, 1997).
 7KHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVWSHUVSHFWLYH
The main opponents to this view are the inter-governmentalists who regard the EU as an
international organisation. This perspective focuses on the role of the member-states.
According to Moravcsik (1991, p. 75): ’The primary source of integration lies in the interests
of the states themselves and the relative power they bring to Brussels’. European integration
does hence proceed by a sequential process of domestic preference formation followed by
inter-governmental bargaining (ibid).
Delegation of power and competence to a European level, and to supranational institutions,
are results of conscious decisions by the member-states in order to attain their broader aims.
The development of EU environmental policy is a wanted development by the member-states.
The explanations to the common climate target are according to this view to be found in the
interest and bargaining power of the member-states.
 $WKLUGSHUVSHFWLYH
This dissertation will look at both these theories of environmental policy-making in the EU,
to see whether they can explain the decision to set a common climate target for the member-
states at EC level. Then it will suggest a third approach that combines elements of both
models, arguing that the European Union is both a supranational entity and an inter-
governmental system. The respective significance of the two elements varies between
individual policy areas, within policy areas and at different stages in the policy making
process (Hertier et. al, 1996). To understand the development of Community policies, it is
therefor necessary to apply a comprehensive approach and look at the role of the actors at
different stages in the policy-making process.
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 7KHSDWKWRDFRPPRQSURSRVDO
 7KHKLVWRU\RIFOLPDWHSROLF\LQWKH(8
This study has shown that the agreement on a common climate target has far-reaching
consequences and implies a delegation of power from the member-states to European
institutions. Before going into this discussion on the roles and motives of the various actors, a
brief resume of the history of climate policy within the EU is useful.
The process towards a common target for reduction of CO2 emissions within the EU, must be
understood in the context of a larger international process. The first initiatives from different
actors within the then called EC in the late 1980s, coincided with the first steps by actors
within the UN. From the very beginning, the development in the EU has been parallel to the
increasing international awareness on the issue. The international process has to a large extent
determined the timetable for the EU (Bergesen, 1991).
This dissertation will concentrate on the process that started with the first conference of the
Parties under the Framework convention of Climate Change (FCCC) in Berlin in 1995. At
this meeting, the parties agreed that the non-binding agreement from the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 199214, was inadequate to
solve the problem of climate change. They concluded that work should be commenced to
identify and agree suitable reduction targets within the end of 1997 (The Berlin Mandate)15.
This was however not the first time climate change was on the political agenda in the
Community. In order to understand the positions of the various actors in the post-Berlin
negotiations, a brief resume of the preceding process will be given.
Parallel with the first session of  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
organised by the UN in 1988, the Commission sent a communication to the Council that
reviewed the scientific findings on climate change and proposed a comprehensive program for
studying the policy options available to the Community16. The Council subsequently
endorsed the program17. The next important initiative from the Commission was a concrete
proposal of a clear commitment by industrial countries to stabilise their CO2 emissions on
1990 levels within year 2000. Implicit in the proposal was the concept of burden sharing
(Haigh, 1996). A differentiated approach was emphasised to safeguard the poorer member-
states (Huber, 1995, p.18).
The proposal was adopted at a joint Environment Council and Energy Council in November
199018. It must be stressed that the target of stabilisation was not embodied in any legal text,
and was also qualified by the assumption that other leading countries, in particular the USA,
undertook similar commitments (Haigh, 1996 and Wagner, 1997).
                                                
14
 At this conference, the EC and a number of countries committed themselves to stabilise their emissions of
CO2 on 1990 level within year 2000.
15
 See Grubb et al, 1996 for further elaboration of the Berlin Mandate.
16
 See ‘The Greenhouse effect and the Community’, Commission of the EC, November 1988 (COM 88/656).
17See  Council resolution on the greenhouse effect and the Community of July 1989 (O.J. 89/C183).
18
 See ‘Community policy targets on the greenhouse issue’, communication from the Commission of 16 March
1990 (COM 90/496).
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The common stabilisation target was further based on targets and expected developments in
the individual member-states. It was not premised upon a review of existing and future
potential for stabilising CO2 emissions for the EC as a whole, rather it was a result of a
pledge-and-review round in which the member-states presented their expected future
emissions (Ringius, 1997). Several member-states had by that time already adopted national
policies to curb, stabilise or reduce emissions (Wagner, 1997), and the bottom-up round
showed that stabilisation of CO2 within 10 years was an attainable goal for the EC
(Bergersen, 1991). Rather than being a genuine EC policy, the stabilisation target was hence a
pragmatic way to ensure that the EC had a common proposal to the second World Climate
Conference in November 1990 (Wagner, 1997). The political commitment to stabilise CO2
emissions was a conscious attempt by the EC to establish itself as a leader in the area of
climate policy (Haigh, 1996).
Following the adoption of the stabilisation target, the Environment Directorate General (DG
XI) and the Energy Directorate General (DG XVII) presented a joint proposal on how to
reduce CO2 emissions. They argued that an adequate response strategy should include a
variety of elements such as regulatory measures, fiscal instruments, economical instruments
and burden sharing. From the very beginning, the two DGs had contrasting views on how
ambitious the EU response to climate change should be. While the Environment DG wanted
radical measures to reduce emissions, the Energy DG argued that the Community should not
undertake these measures alone, but had to be followed by the US and Japan. Still, they
finally managed to come up with a common proposal (European Commission, 1991).
This proposal did however trigger intensive debates, and it soon became clear that it would be
difficult to reach agreement on choice of strategy. The idea of setting national emissions
targets at EC level through a system of burden sharing was met with resistance from several
member-states. This was mainly due to the reluctance to transfer power over an issue that was
likely to affect so many aspects of national life (Haigh, 1996, p. 163).
The international development in the policy areas did however force the EU to come up with
some concrete measures to reach the stabilisation goal. The United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, UNCED, that was to be held in Rio 1992 was approaching,
and if the EC was to keep its role as a leader in environmental and climate policy, it had to
‘put some policy flesh on the bone’ (Haigh, 1997, p.164.)
Just before the conference, the Commission therefore presented a five-point plan containing
much of what the environment and energy directorates had proposed, except from a common
reduction target and burden sharing. Most emphasis was on the proposed directive of a
common energy/ CO2 tax. The focus was hence on finding common means, and the idea of
finding a common target was left out.
The initiative enabled the EC to play a leadership role at the conference. According to
Wagner (1997, p339); most observers would agree that ‘without EC leadership in the decisive
phases of the negotiations of the FCCC, the Convention, despite its obvious short-comings,
would not have attained its present form’. Both the US and Japan have since the beginning
played a reactive role in the international climate negotiations. In particular the US
government adopted a stance of rejecting all concrete and ambitious counter measures
(Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993). The EC has hence had the opportunity to fill this political
vacuum, and take a leadership in the negotiations (Bergersen, 1991).
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After the Rio summit the member-states had to decide whether to endorse the proposals from
the Commissions or not. An intensive debate followed. The debate was dominated by the
Commission who urged the member-states to agree to its proposals, Germany, Denmark and
the Netherlands who supported most of the proposals from the Commission (Huber, 1995)
and Britain, France and the cohesion countries who opposed most of them (Wagner, 1997).
The only substantial propose from the Commission that survived this process was that the
Commission should monitor the development and strategies of the member-states19.
Basically, the result of the discussion was that the member-states themselves had the
responsibility to ensure that the target was reached (Haigh, 1997, p.183).
No important new initiatives came up on a European level until the next round of
international negotiations on climate change in Berlin 1995. By that time, the knowledge and
understanding of the seriousness of climate change had become more wide spread. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 20 had presented several reports stressing
the possible fatal consequences of climate change. This had led to increasing public concern
on the issue, and some of the EC member-states such as Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands had set ambitious national targets. Economical and technological development
had also contributed to changes in expected future emissions in some countries. In the UK,
privatisation has led to the substitution of gas for coal in the electric supply industry (Grubb et
al 1997). Together with the economic recession this had led to the closing down of many coal
mills, which subsequently had contributed to a reduction in the country’s CO2 emissions.
At the FCCC meeting in Berlin 1995, the EU member-states had no common opinion as to
how the final UN convention should be, or the shape of a corresponding EC target21.The
domestic targets in the member-states in 1995, show that the ambitions in this policy area
varied substantially. Some countries had set fairly ambitious domestic reduction targets
whereas others expected increasing emissions. Put together, the national targets and expected
development in the member-states would amount to a little less than 10% reduction in the EU
wide emissions within 2005 (European Commission, 1996b).
The Commission was concerned that the EC should continue to play a leading role in the
international negotiations. To do so, the Community had to come up with an ambitious
reduction target in order to have credibility when demanding others to do the same. According
to the Commission the EC target had to be more ambitious than the synthesis of the member-
states targets and expected developments. In a discussion paper the Commission conclude that
‘it would therefor not be credible to propose less than 10% EC wide reductions by 2005.’22
Following this, the Commission proposed a 10% reduction within 2005 and a system of
burden sharing among the member-states. The focus was now primarily on finding a common
target, and the discussion on finding common means postponed.
The Council did however reject the proposal, as they failed to agree on a how such a burden
sharing should be. The Commissions proposal was rather similar to the obligations the
                                                
19
 For a more thoroughly examination of this debate see Wagner 1997 and Haigh 1997.
20
 The UN established the IPCC in 1988, consisting of 130 scientists from all over the world, to provide
accurate and credible information on climate change and its consequences.
21
 FCCC/AGBM/199610. 19 November 1996: Synthesis of Proposal by Parties.
22
 As cited in Ringius 1997, p.19.
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member-states finally agreed to in March 1997 (Ringius, 1997), but at this stage, the member-
states were not yet ready to make the necessary concessions.
The next initiative came from the Irish presidency at the Environment Council in December
1996 where they proposed a slightly less ambitious proposal than the Commission23, namely a
flexible 5-10% reduction within 200524. In the period from the process started in 1995 till the
December meeting in 1996, the member-states national targets and expectations had however
changed. Increasing awareness of the costs of climate policy and decreasing public pressure
have been put forward as explanations on why the member-states lowered their national
ambitions (Wagner, 1997).
This time the member-states were therefore even less willing to agree on an ambitious target.
The only remaining opportunity to reach an agreement, and re-gain the leadership role, was
the Environmental Council meeting in March 1997, just before the crucial FCCC meeting in
Bonn (Ringius, 1997). This would be the last meeting before the summit in Kyoto in
December where the protocol was to be signed.
The Netherlands had the presidency that spring, and started it by introducing the so-called
‘Triptique’ approach to burden sharing. This approach was based on a separation of the
economy into three sectors. A country’s obligations should correspond with its performance
and possibilities in these sectors according to reduced CO2 emissions. After informally
presenting the ‘Triptique’ perspective to the member-states, the Dutch presidency presented a
proposal of 15% reduction within 2010, and burden-sharing based on a modified version of
the ‘Triptique’ burden sharing model (Ringius, 1997).
The EC Ad Hoc Group on Climate, met in February to discuss the Dutch proposal. Even
though the Triptique approach had been welcomed as a useful initiative, particularly in the
smaller member-states (Ringius, 1997), it soon became clear that the proposal did not
correspond with what the individual member-states were willing to contribute. At the
February meeting, they presented informal pledges on what they saw as acceptable national
reduction targets:
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 The EU Presidency always works closely together with the Commission. The new adjusted proposal was
hence in accordance with the wishes of the Commission.
24
 Europe Daily Bulletin No. 6870, 9th December 1996
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BELGIUM -10%
DENMARK -25%
GERMANY -25%
GREECE (+10%)
SPAIN +15%
FRANCE -5%
IRELAND (+10%)
ITALY -5%
LUXEMBOURG -30%
NETHERLANDS -10%
AUSTRIA -25%
PORTUGAL (+25%)
FINLAND (-5%)
SWEDEN +5%
UNITED KINGDOM -10%
EC-15 -11%
Source: EC Ad Hoc group on Climate February 1997
Put together, the total EC reduction would be 11% within 2010. This was perceived to be
insufficient to influence Japan and the USA to set more ambitious targets (Ringius, 1997),
and the possibility for the EC to play a leadership role in the international climate negotiation
was hence under strong pressure.
When the Environment Council met in March 1997, the prospect of agreeing on a radical
proposal was however getting even darker. Several member-states wanted to lower their
responsibility according to the informal pledges made less than a month ago in the EC Ad
Hoc Group (Ringius, 1997). In particular the cohesion countries wanted to increase their
emissions targets from their unfinished informal pledges, as these had not been sufficiently
developed at the February meeting.
Among the other member-states, there was little willingness to take a larger share than they
had proposed in February. At some point it was unclear whether the EC wide reduction would
exceed 10% within 2010 (Ringius, 1997). This would have left the Community with no
credibility in the coming international negotiations, which again could have a very damaging
effect on the possibility of reaching an agreement at the Kyoto summit. Why should other
industrialised countries then commit themselves to substantial emission reductions? - And
how could a world-wide agreement be possible, when the relatively homogenous and highly
integrated EC member-states were not able to reach one? (Wagner, 1997).
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 The informal pledges of Finland, Portugal, Ireland and Greece were not yet clear (Ringius, 1997) .
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Faced with the possibility of loosing their credibility, the Environment Council finally agreed
to a proposal made by the Danish environmental minister Svend Auken to set a Community
wide target of 15%, but only distribute 10% of the reductions26. The rest would eventually be
distributed after the Kyoto protocol was signed. If the final reduction target from Kyoto would
be 15%, the last five-percent would be subject to internal negotiations. As it was widely
believed that the Kyoto target would not exceed a 15% reductions and probably be less
stringent, the 10/15 negotiating result was not expected to compromise the EC in the global
negotiations (Ringius, 1997). The proposal was further qualified as the Environmental
Council stated firmly that the ultimate Community target would be determined by the
outcome of the Kyoto summit27.
The burden-sharing that was agreed on at the March meeting, was more similar to the
informal pledges made by the member-states at the EC Ad Hoc Group meeting in February
than the Dutch proposal. The final proposal did hence to some extent resemble the pledge and
review round that led to the stabilisation target in the late 1980s. Still it was fundamentally
different because the Council stated in the rationale for the burden-sharing that a number of
national circumstances were taken into account in the distribution. By this, a set of neutral
criteria has been established which can be of high importance when setting further common
targets. In addition, the decision to have a common target implied a transfer of the area of
climate policy from the national level to the EC. Finally, the proposal ensured that the EC
could continue to play a leadership role and put political pressure on other industrialised
countries (Wagner, 1997)28.
                                                
26
 In reality, only 9.2% reductions in emissions were distributed.
27
 Council conclusions (1997) Community Strategy on Climate Change, Document 6309/07
28
 The actual contribution of the EC in the Kyoto process is under debate. Many negotiators from the other
parties, in particular the USA and Japan, were irritated by the behaviour of the EC as they perceived the EC
proposal as superficial and unrealistic. Interview with government official at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
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 ([SODQDWLRQV±WKHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOLVW
SHUVSHFWLYH
From an inter-governmentalist perspective the common climate target is seen as a result of the
interest of the member-states and their respective bargaining power. The focus is hence on the
goal and preferences of national actors. Why did the member-states, represented in the
Environment Council, finally decide to set a common reduction target? As the brief resume of
the history showed, the Environmental Council refused this delegation of powers to the EC
level when the Commission first proposed it in the beginning of the 1990s. Finally they
managed to overcome the obstacles and reach an agreement. In this chapter, three factors will
be elaborated in order to explain the member-states’ decision to set a common EU target,
namely ‘green’ reasons, economic reasons and finally, EU’s position in international trade
and competition.
 µ*UHHQ¶UHDVRQV
The member-states are often divided into leaders and laggards according to their attitude
towards environmental policy (Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993 and Sbragia, 1996). Some
countries, in particular Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, have a record of attempting
to increase environmental protection in the EU. In these countries, a high level of
environmental protection is generally perceived as a social good, and a desirable political goal
(Hertier et. al 1996).
The Cohesion countries are usually regarded as laggards when it comes to environmental
protection. They tend to oppose most plans of common environmental standards and policies
(Majone, 1996). In these member-states, public concern about environmental problems is
relatively low, and many other policy areas have higher priority. Another reason for their
reluctance towards common environmental standards is that this normally implies increased
costs as well as diminishing comparative advantages from having low environmental
standards (Scharpf, 1996). The accession to stricter environmental standards is often
compensated by transactions from Brussels through for instance the structural funds
mechanism (Heller, 1998).
In addition to the Cohesion countries, Britain is often put in the laggard category.  The UK is
usually conceived as a particular awkward partner in the EU as she alone has resisted
integration in a variety of fields, most notably social policy and environmental policy
(George, 1991). In the latter case, this often comes from a combination of little interest in
environmental problems29 and reluctance to give up sovereignty30. The rest of the member-
states have often a more neutral role in the environmental discussions in the EU.
In the area of climate policy, the traditional leader-laggard division is somewhat inappropriate
as the individual CO2 emission targets of the various member-states to a large degree is
determined by factors such as the source of their energy supply, their industrial structure and
the transport sector. In some member-states, large reductions of CO2 emissions can be
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 For a further discussion on Britain’s perceptions and attitudes towards environmental problems, see
Golub,1997 and Navjord, 1995.
30
 For more discussion on this, see Stephen George ‘Britain an Awkward partner, 1991,
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implemented with relatively low costs, whereas in other member-states reductions in the same
scale would be very costly indeed. Germany and the UK can for instance with relatively low
costs reduce their CO2 emissions by switching from coal to a more environment friendly
alternative. Many countries do not have this option as their source of energy supply already
emits little CO2. France is for instance highly dependent on nuclear power and cannot
radically reduce emissions of CO2 by changes in her energy supply sector. Reductions must
therefore be implemented in other sectors and often to much higher costs.
The national ambitions in the area of climate policy do to some extent correspond with the
costs of reductions. Britain is for instance one of the major contributors to the EC target,
being responsible for almost 20% of the total EC reductions31. The British contribution is
hence crucial for the total EC target32. However, it is still the countries that usually promote
environmental policy in the EU, that also have been the driving forces in the area of climate
change (Ringius, 1997). When the issue first appeared on the political agenda, the
Netherlands, Germany and Denmark ‘urged to action’ as the potential damage was considered
enormous (Huber, 1997, p. 23). The UK did on the other hand request more certainty before
introducing policies to reduce CO2 emissions (ibid)33.
 The main contributor to the common reduction target is Germany. She is not only the largest
contributor to the total reductions, but has also been a driving force in order to reach an
agreement. Germany had when the negotiation started set her own target of 25% reduction in
CO2 emissions by 2000. Denmark and the Netherlands had also set national targets before the
Berlin conference. These member-states do not contribute so much in quantity of CO2
reductions, but have both been important contributors to the negotiation process. They had all
ambitious national targets that they could not leave without embarrassment (Ringius, 1997).
Reducing their national targets would be politically difficult on a domestic level, and it would
also be damaging for their position as self-declared environmental leaders in the EU34.
Britain, Belgium, Italy and France had a different approach to the negotiations. None of them
had set ambitious targets when the international negotiation process started in 199535. Britain
and Italy still held on to their stabilisation targets from the UNCED meeting in Rio in 1992,
Belgium expected a 5% increase and France had her own special mode, having a target of not
exceeding annual CO2 emissions per capita of 7.33 tonnes. These member-states had no
prestige in getting a particular result of the process. There were no strong domestic forces
demanding a radical target, rather there was a demand that they should avoid extensive
costs36. These countries did all strengthen their targets through the process, but were by no
means eager to take a large share in order to ensure an ambitious EC target (Ringius, 1997).
Except from Britain, they were however all strongly in favour of a common EC target with
internal differentiation. As none of them planned reductions or at least not at the level that
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 These numbers are from the March 1997 agreement
32
 Personal interview with a Norwegian Government official.
33
 For further discussions on Germany and Britain’s different approach to the ‘precautionary principle’, see
Navjord 1995.
34
 For more discussion on environmental leaders in the EU, see  Jachtenfuchs anh Huber 1993.
35
 FCCC/AGBM/199610. 19 November 1996: Synthesis of Proposal by Parties.
36
 The industrial lobby, represented in particular by The Union of Industrial and Employers UNICE and The
European Chemical Industry Federation was very active in the discussion on climate policy. They tried to
prevent any targets and measures that would harm Europe’s competitiveness. See Wagner 1997.
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was expected to be the result of the Kyoto meeting, they needed a common EC target to be
able to sign the protocol37. The same was the situation for the cohesion countries. All the
cohesion countries planned to increase their emissions of CO2 in order to ensure economic
development. As individual countries, they could therefore not sign the FCCC since this
would bind them first to stabilise their emissions, and then guarantee reductions. According to
Haigh (1996, p.181), these countries have ‘a very good reason for wanting the EC to be a
party (of the FCCC) since otherwise it is doubtful that they fulfil the requirements of the
convention’.
Not signing would however not place them in a very favourable light internationally. For
them it was therefor important that the EC had a common target based on burden-sharing so
that they could both increase their emission and sign the FCCC, and thereby stay in the group
of ‘the good guys’. (Haigh, 1997). Several member-states that often are conceived as laggards
in EC environmental policy were therefor in favour of a common EC target for CO2
reductions.
The international process did therefore put a pressure on the member-states. To ensure a
position among the environmentally concerned countries world wide, several member-states
were dependent on a common EC reduction target. Some countries, in particular Germany
and the Netherlands, did also express the ambition that the EU should not only be among the
leading environmental actors, but the leading actor. Most EU member-states share a common
interest in creating a sufficient unity to be recognised as a global power (Wagner, 1997).
Although there where strong divisions among the member-states on how ambitious their
response to climate change should be, they formally agreed through a number of declarations
from the Council that the EU should take a leading role in the international climate
negotiations.
 (FRQRPLFUHDVRQV
One of the reasons why the member-states with a high level of environmental protection want
to increase the environmental standards in the EU, is to ensure that their domestic industry is
not faced with too different conditions from its competitors in the other member-states.
Unilateral measures to reduce CO2 emissions entail a competitive disadvantage for domestic
industry. The countries that had introduced such measures, wanted to limit these costs by
making sure that competing industry in the other member-states were subject to the same
measures and costs38.
The largest contributor to the reduction target, Germany, has a tradition of a dual strategy
towards environmental problems; proposing higher environmental standards and develop
environmental technology. Once the other member-states have committed themselves to
environmental improvements through EU legislation, this technology can be exported.
Germany is today one of the world’s largest producer of environmentally technology. This
strategy was also perceived as profitable on broader international level. The EU should
establish itself as a leader in environmental sound technologies, which are considered to be a
                                                
37
 Interview with a Norwegian Government official.
38
 For more discussion on why high-regulatory member-states want to export their regulatory regime, see
Majone, 1996 and Hertier et. al 1996) .
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large marked, and where the main competitors, the US and Japan, have not become leaders
yet (Huber, 1995).
However, the main economic reason for the relatively ambitious reduction target is probably
that it was perceived that it could be implemented at relatively low costs. Germany who takes
the by far largest share, expect to do this mainly by improving the technology in former
Eastern Germany39.
Britain is in a similar situation. The main bulk of reductions in Britain came from the closing
down of coal mills. This was not done for environmental reasons40, but is due to privatisation
and economic recession. Together these two member-states shouldered more than 90 % of the
total reductions. The EU could therefor gain the position as an environmental leader at
relatively low costs41.
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDOFRPSHWLWLRQ
The EC proposal of 15% reduction was based on internal differentiation of responsibilities.
The contribution from the member-states’ varied from 40% increase in national emissions
(Portugal), to 25% decrease (Germany, Denmark and Austria). However, in the negotiations
of the FCCC, the EC argued strongly that all the parties to the Convention should have the
same reduction target and opposed all proposals of a worldwide differentiation of
responsibilities. The burden-sharing model should only be applied among the EU member-
states and not on an international level. Instead they proposed a flat rate for all countries.
It is simple to see that such an agreement would be beneficial for the EU compared to its main
competitors, Japan and the US. Since the EU could implement its target with relatively low
costs, a flat-rate target would give the EU a competitive advantage compared to the US and
Japan where similar reductions would entail higher costs. The EU had hence clear economic
interest in a flat, non-differentiated reduction target42.
This examination has identified a number of reasons why it was in the interest of the member-
states to agree on a common proposal to the international climate negotiations, in the form of
the March 1997 agreement.
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 Interview with a Norwegian Government official.
40
 The Economist, August 7th, 1998.
41
 The Director of EEA, Domingo Jiminez-Beltran, argues however that many of the easy measures to increase
energy efficiency already have been put into use, and that the remaining job to reduce CO2- emissions will be far
more costly.
42
 Interview with a Norwegian Government official.
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 ([SODQDWLRQ±WKHQHRIXQFWLRQDOLVWSHUVSHFWLYH
The main argument from the neo-functionalist perspective is that spill-over from other sectors
and the integration process as a whole, have created a structural pressure that has led to
integration in the area of climate policy. The Commission has been central in this process by
providing technical and scientific background for discussions and proposals for action.
 )XQFWLRQDOVSLOORYHUIURPRWKHUVHFWRUV
Firstly the decision to set a common climate target can be seen as a natural extension of the
Community’s role in West European environmental policy-making (Wagner, 1997).
Environmental policy has become a major policy area in the EU, considering the substantial
amount of common environmental legislation43. In several member-states, all environmental
legislation is introduced on initiative from the EU, and not national politicians.
Secondly, a common climate target is a logical consequence of the relationship between CO2
emissions and policy sectors such as transport and energy. The Fifth environmental
programme’s emphasis on the importance of integrating environmental concerns into other
major Community policies such as industry, energy and transport, clearly shows this spill-
over effect (Colliere, 1996, p. 9).
A third reason why the climate target was set on an EC level was the international character of
the problem. Climate change is an international problem that can not be solved at a national
level. CO2 emissions know no borders, and the damages caused by climate changes may not
be related to the countries own emissions. The EU exists to solve problems that can not be
solved at a national level (Weale, 1996). Climate change does hence provide a prime example
on the ‘raison d’être’ for the EU.
 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ
By its first communication to the Council in 1988, the Commission placed the issue of
climate change on the political agenda and provided scientific background for the following
discussion. The Commission hence did the same for the EU as the IPCC attempted to do for
the whole world, namely to establish a stock of causes and effects of climate change, to
constitute the basis for further action (Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993, p. 42)
Secondly, the proposal from the Commission on adequate measures to combat climate change
set the framework for the discussion in the Council and among other actors. Some scholars
argue that the Commission presented too radical proposals too soon, and therefor delayed the
process towards a common climate policy rather than facilitated it (Wagner, 1997). This is
open to debate, it is however clear that the Commission was the agenda setter in the
Community in this policy area (Hertier et. Al, 1996)44.
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 More than 200 directives and regulations covering a number of areas are in force, and five Environmental
Programs have been produced.
44
 According to Hertier et. al, 1996, the role of the Commission in climate politics differed from its role in most
environmental regulation. Usually, the Commission responds to initiatives from the member-states to introduce
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There are several reasons why the Commission wanted a common climate target for the
European Community. Firstly, the Commission is the ‘Conscience of the Union’ (Haaland,
Matlary, 1995), and shall work for an ‘ever closer union’45. The Commission wants therefore,
almost by definition, to expand EC policies into new areas and ‘further the supranational
integration of policies’ (Hertier et. al, 1996, p. 27).
The Commission did also from the very start emphasise the importance of the international
role of the Community in the area of climate policy. Japan and USA, who usually have
dominant positions in international meetings and negotiations, were very passive in the
negotiations on climate change. Both countries were from the very start reluctant to set
ambitious targets and stayed away from any leadership function in the negotiations. This
opened a unique possibility for the EC to play a major international role (Hertier et. al 1996
and Bergesen, 1991). The Commissioner for Environment, Ripa de Meana, introduced the
concept of ‘environmental leadership’ which became the basis for the Commission’s
proposals (Jachtenfuchs, 1994). The ambition to play such a role is expressed for instance in a
communication from the Commission (European Commission 1991) where it argues that the
EC has the moral, economic and political power and authority to present an example for other
OECD countries. Further it states that the Commission intends to take over a leadership role
in ‘the protection of the environment and the sustainable use of natural resources’.
In addition to these more general reasons, two Directorate Generals were particularly
interested in arriving at a common target, namely the Environment DG and the Energy DG.
On a national level, these two sectors are often in conflict. The explanation to why the
alliance on the EC level came about in the early phase of climate policy is however quite
simple. For the Environment DG, the climate area was a test case of the political will to
integrate environmental protection in other sector policies. If they succeeded in developing a
coherent climate policy, this would change the political stature of the Environment DG in the
Euro-bureaucracy. They would reach a level to be envied by the other sectors as environment
no longer would be ‘any other sector’, but a concern that cuts across bureaucratic cleavages
(Bergesen, 1991 p.13)
The Energy DG saw the climate issue as an opportunity to establish a common energy policy,
which had been fiercely resisted by the member-states since the Commission first proposed it
in the 1970s (Ibid. p13).  The proposal of a common energy policy confronted a very different
pattern of energy supply in the member-states. Some of them are richly endowed with energy
resources while some have none apart from the sun (Haigh, 1996). The member-states have
hence very different interests in energy matters46.
A coherent common climate policy would however require a substantial reorientation of
energy consumption and production that could not be achieved on a national level. A common
climate policy would hence pave the way for a common energy policy.
However, as soon as the possible costs were revealed, the alliance broke. The Energy DG
started to question the benefits of an aggressive climate policy, as this would create
significant economic costs. A number of other DG’s got involved in the discussion, in
                                                                                                                                                       
new regulatory policy. In the case of climate policy, these initiatives were absent, and the Commission therefore
had to make the proposals itself
45
 The Treaty of Rome.
46
 For a further discussion on the development of an EU energy policy, see Janne Haaland Matlary, 1998.
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particular the DG for taxation, (DG XXI) who mainly represented industrial interests and was
highly critical to all measures that could harm the industry.
The internal division in the Commission made it difficult to maintain the leadership role it
had adopted in the beginning of the process (Haigh, 1996). Secondly, the early ‘policisation’
of the policy area also contributed to the placing of the Commission on the sideline. The
Commission did play an important role in the beginning of the process, but several factors
made it difficult to maintain this role in the final stages.
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The agreement in the Environment Council of March 1997 came as a surprise to most
observers and the target was immediately regarded as a radical contribution to the
international negotiation process. The Council lists up a number of national circumstances
that have been taken into account when deciding on the distribution of responsibilities for the
March 1997 target. The final distribution was however a political decision, rather than a result
of a mechanical formula (Ringius, 1997, p. 25). When looking at the final burden-sharing, it
does to some extent resemble the initial national targets of the member-states. One can
therefore argue that it looks as if a pledge and review round has taken place. This dissertation
will however argue that the criteria listed by the Council are important, as they establish the
principle of burden-sharing as a way to combat climate change.
Another important aspect with the decision was that some of the member-states through the
negotiations made stronger efforts to combat climate change than they otherwise would have
done, and that it ensured that all the member-states became parties to the Convention. Finally,
the decision was an important one because it implied that the setting of climate targets has
become a European policy area.
 :K\GLGWKH(8DJUHHRQDFRPPRQFOLPDWHWDUJHW"
The reason why the member-states finally agreed to this transfer of competence and
sovereignty is to be found in the interest of the major actors in the policy area, which in the
case of setting a common climate target primarily have been the Commission and the Council.
Both the ‘green’ forces, and those who usually are most occupied with economical
considerations, had a common interest in setting a common EU target. This dissertation will
claim that the EU never would have agreed on a 15% reduction target simply for
environmental reasons as the economic interests still are dominant in the union (Collier,
1997).
The close cooperation and the exchange of information and arguments between the member-
states, did however create an internal climate which facilitated the process of finding a
common target47. The process itself has hence contributed to the final result.
The success of agreeing on a common climate target must also be understood in the light of
the international process in this policy-area. The UN negotiations did to a large extent set the
timetable for the internal development in the EU. External factors such as Japan’s and US’
reluctance to commit themselves to an ambitious climate policy, are also important in
explaining why the EU decided to take a leadership role in the international climate
negotiations.
This dissertation has concentrated on the role of the Commission and the Council. To get a
full understanding of the process, it is necessary to look at the role of other actors as well. The
conclusions presented are hence not proposed as the final and definitive explanations. Rather
it is a part of a larger process of explaining, describing and understanding why the EU decided
to set a common reduction target.
                                                
47
 Interview with Official from the EEA
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 $UHYLHZRIWKHWKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFKHV
The March 1997 agreement can not be explained by a pure neo-functionalistic approach. The
neo-functionalist approach helps to locate climate policy within the general dynamics of task
expansion in the Community. Some actors saw the development of a common climate policy
as a logical extension of the Community’s competence in environmental policy.
Another ‘mechanical’ reason for setting a common climate target was that other policy areas
in the community such as transport and energy, highly influence the emissions of CO2. In this
respect, spill-over from other policy sectors paved the way for a common climate policy.
The neo-functionalist approach does however fail to explain the form and the content of the
final agreement  (Golub, 1996, p.702).  Nor it is particularly useful when trying to understand
the long and intensive negotiation process in the Council leading up to the final decision of
March 1997. As Golub (1997, p. 19) argues: ‘Functionalism tells us why there might be
something to sign, perhaps even what might be signed, but bargaining tells us what interest
were taken into negotiations and why states signed the specific environmental proposal’.
The inter-governmentalist approach is thus superior in order to understand the final
negotiation and bargaining, but has also important gaps and weaknesses. The first initiatives
from the Commission to put the issue of climate change on the political agenda in the EC
does not fit in with this theory. This dissertation will therefore argue that a comprehensive
approach is necessary when examining the development towards a common climate target in
the EU. The European Union is both a supranational entity and an inter-governmental system.
The respective importance of the two elements varies at different stages in the policy making
process (Hertier et. al, 1996).
At the first stage of the policy-making process, the supranational Commission has important
powers in having monopoly on initiating and formulating policies (Matlary, 1993). It is also
important in establishing the scientific or factual basis for policy-making. The member-states
attempt to influence the Commission in the initial process in order to ensure policies that are
in accordance with their own policy regime (Hertiere et. Al, 1996 and Majone 1993). It is
however the Commission that has the final word in deciding the content and form of any
proposal presented to the Council. The Commission can also withdraw a proposal at any stage
in the process.
The last step in a policy-making process is the final decision in the Council, which in some
ways is comparable to the making of an international treaty involving negotiations between
governments behind closed doors (Wagner, 1997). Once decisions are made and/or legislation
is adopted, the similarity diminishes, as EC legislation becomes directly applicable in the
member-states. EC legislation is even superior to national legislation48.
For a decision to be reached it must have the consent of the Commission and a necessary
majority in the Council. The framework of environmental policy-making in the EC is hence a
system of governance operating on the principle of concurrent majorities among leading
actors (Weale, 1996). The result is a rule-making process that has to secure agreement from
                                                
48
 The Treaty of Rome established the principle of preliminary rulings, which allowed the ECJ to interpret
Community law for national courts. It was two such referrals the Van Gend and Loos ruling in 1963 and the
Costa ruling the following year, that established the two key doctrines of direct effect and supremacy.
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many and different actors. This often leads to what Scharpf (1995) has termed a ‘joint
decision’ trap where optimal decisions are not reached. However, in the area of climate policy
the EC has, to the surprise of many close observers, managed to reach a common decision
(Ringius, 1997, p. 6). Following Scharpf (1995), agreements are possible when the major
actors in the EC, in particular the member-states and the Commission, have strong interests in
finding a common solution.
As concluded earlier, this was the situation in the case of setting a common climate target for
the member-states in the European Union. Even though there were disagreements concerning
how ambitious the common target should be, the main actors wanted a solution.  The
Commission was an early proponent for a common target, followed by a majority of the
member-states that for various reasons wanted to reach such an agreement.
This review has shown that EU environmental policy-making is best understood by looking at
the union as both a supranational and an inter-governmental organisation. To capture the
reality of the development of a common climate target, a comprehensive approach is needed.
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